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VIRTUE OF ATTUNEMENT:
CONTRIBUTIONS OF YUASA YASUO’S EMBODIED SELF-CULTIVATION
PRACTICES TO TED TOADVINE’S ECOPHENOMENOLOGY OF DIFFERENCE
Introduction: Rise in Environmentalism
Environmental consciousness has been on the rise in modern social life. Environmental
issues are gaining increased recognition and environmental movements are occurring on both the
macro and micro level. The dramatic increase of macro-level institutional reform of the last
several decades have pushed a substantive amount of environmentally-friendly policies. Notable
manifestations include major developments in sustainable energy. For example, the United States
Department of Energy has “doubled renewable energy generation from wind, solar, and
12

geothermal sources since 2008.” A parallel cultural movement is simultaneously occurring on
the micro, community-level. Green initiatives have seen growing popularity in activities such as
urban gardening, bike culture, and ‘eco-’ businesses, which are rapidly appearing across the
3

country. While it does not seem that these trends adequately address serious environmental
changes such as global warming, flooding, deforestation, and pollution, they do suggest that
there is a normative push to reevaluate one’s relatedness to the environment at a personal level.

1
The White House, “American Made Energy,” Energy and Environment,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/snapshots/american-made-energy (accessed April 9, 2013).
2
Other contemporary developments include the first National Ocean Policy that protects ocean health,
expansive land conservation policy, reducing mountain-top removal coal mining, and incentives to curb air pollution
in motor vehicles. More examples and information can be found at the White House website: The White House,
Energy and Environment, http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy (accessed March 7, 2013). While there are long roots
of American Environmentalism, there has been a serious spike in the environmental movement starting in 1970 with
the creation of Earth Day. Earth Day pushed the Clean Air Act of 1970, the Clean Water Act of 1972, the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, and finally the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency. For more
information, examine Philip Shabecoff, Earth Rising: American Environmentalism in the 21st  Century (Washington
D.C.: Island Press, 2000).
3
To look at an example of growing urban farming initiatives, see Zusha Elinson, “Urban Farming for Cash
Gains a Toehold in San Francisco,” The Bay Citizen, 13 August 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/13/us/13bcfarm.html?ref=urbanagriculture&_r=0 (accessed April 9, 2013).
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1.1 Rise in Environmental Ethics
The rise in environmental consciousness has been accompanied by normative analysis
and response. Environmental ethics has seen significant growth within the last several decades
4

as a way to understand our relatedness to the environment. The breadth of environmental ethics
covers expansive ground. Implications of environmental ethics have substantial impact on all
aspects of life. It can affect how we teach our responsibilities and understanding of the
environment in the public school system, influence political decisions, and change economic
development. The question of relatedness is also critical in understanding the relationship
between self, others, and the surrounding space that we occupy. Environmental ethics has grown
broadly as it tries to reconcile the many possibilities and concerns. Before I go into specific
examples, I wish to elaborate on the idea of environmental ethics.
1.1.1 What is Environmental Ethics? Environmental ethics can be described as the
responsibilities toward the environment. What sort of notions arise when one thinks of the
environment in the context of environmental ethics? Often, it is connected to an idea of ‘Nature,’
a large category that includes trees, animals, water, air, glaciers, river, etc. They point to a
conception of nature that is the original, pristine state untouched by the human hand. While this
notion of ‘Nature’ is undoubtedly important especially in terms of conservation, I think it might
also be an oversimplification. It is not unusual that expansive categories such as Nature are
reduced for the sake of practicality and manageability. However, it tends to emphasize ‘exotic

4

By doing a search of Environmental Ethics readers in the Oberlin College database, 20 of the books are
from the 2000s, 13 from the 1990s, 5 from the 1980s, and 2 from 1970. We can see the significant growth of
scholarship within the last two decades.

4

places,’ like tropical rainforests, and deemphasize other environments such as cityscapes, farms,
5

parks, homes, etc. It deemphasizes the lived environments of humans.

I am looking for an environmental ethic that acknowledges the environments that humans
immediately live in. It should explore the normative ways to live in any environment, and
address the encounters we have with others with whom we share our surroundings. The ‘Other’
is everything that is not a part of the individually understood self. It includes other people and
things. It also comprises of the Nature understood as the pristine wilderness as well as nature
that is in our backyards. My environmental ethics is therefore not only geared for
environmental policy, although I definitely think it can contribute to that. It is also seeking an
ethics of living in the world where there is a responsibility to our surroundings and a
responsibility to others. While not every environmental ethicist may agree, here are two
important examples of contemporary environmental ethics that do: Land Ethic and Deep
Ecology.
One of the first influential approaches to contemporary environmental ethics is Land
6

Ethic, made popular by Aldo Leopold. Leopold extends the biotic community to include
animals, plants, soils, water, minerals, etc. into what he collectively calls the Land. Intrinsic
value is placed on the integrity, stability, and beauty of the Land. Within this ethic, however,
excessive growth is seen as a danger to stability. For example, if there was excessive growth of
deer, a land ethicist would agree that the most ethical response would be to control and decrease
their population. This has very problematic implications on human communities, especially

5

A convincing and informative social critique of the term ‘wilderness” is presented by William Cronon,
“The Trouble with Wilderness: or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” Environmental History 1, no. 1 (January
1996): 7-28.
6
Aldo Leopold, “The Land Ethic,” in Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters, What Really Works, eds.
David Schmidtz and Elizabeth Willott, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 27-33.
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those in dense and populated areas. It could discourage social services to impoverished city
communities, propagating certain social, class, and racial conceptions.
Another popular environmental ethic that has grown from the Land Ethic is called Deep
7

Ecology. It declares the intrinsic value of all living things because everything is interconnected
within a harmonious web of life. This monistic picture projects humans as a continuation of
nature. Humans are one more part or extension of natural perfection. One concern that may
arise is how to adequately attend to issues in which one species must be eliminated for the
livelihood of another. For example, a deep ecologist might have difficulty justifying scientific
developments of vaccines that would prevent and eventually eliminate a deadly bacteria or virus.
1.2 Rise in Critical Reception
There has been critical reception to both of these ethics and broader trends in
environmental ethics in general. One of the worries is that the individual, micro-level
8

perspective is underappreciated or ignored. Both Land Ethic and Deep Ecology are disembodied
approaches to the human-nature relation. They do not take into account an individual’s
experience as a physical body within a physical location. On examination, it does not seem that
one’s lived experience of nature always includes harmony, continuation, or homogeneity that an
extended biotic community might suggest. The danger of not acknowledging the body as a
foundation for any sort of relatedness is that real human experiences and voices can be

7

Deep Ecology was first coined by Arne Naess in “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology
Movement: A Summary,” in The Selected Works of Arne Naess, ed. Alan Drengson (Netherlands: Springer, 2005),
2263-2269.
8
Simon P. James discusses the importance of personal experience in environmental ethics in the
introduction of his book, The Presence of Nature: A Study in Phenomenology and Environmental Philosophy,
(Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
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overlooked or silenced. Many critiques of the disembodied view are countered by a variety of
embodiment theories advanced by ecophenomenology.
The budding field of environmental ethics known as ecophenomenology has critiqued
disembodied approaches and replaced them with an embodied view. Ecophenomenology is
predicated on the belief that valuation of the environment must assess human relatedness to
nature by examining the lived experience of nature. In the introductory chapter of
Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself, the editors comment on how a disembodied
understanding of environmental ethics distances environmental concern from personal life:
“Because of accepted mainstream green lingo and removal of real science from everyday people,
the public feels like we are solving the problems without having to reevaluate or modify personal
life; eco-phenomenology is contrarian, asking each individual to examine their own personal
9

experience.” Assuming that the concept of ‘Nature’ is based on constructed assumptions,
phenomenologists attempt to deconstruct ideologies by beginning at one’s lived experience.
Simon P. James describes the methodology of ecophenomenologists, “The first thing to note is
that environmental phenomenologists seek to elucidate what is often referred to as our lived
experience of nature, nature as it discloses itself to us in the living of our lives… To do this, they
set themselves the task of bracketing or putting out of play certain entrenched second-order or
10

theoretical conceptions of what nature is...”

Particular emphasis has been placed on the body,

an important influence by embodiment phenomenologist, Merleau-Ponty. Important scholars
that advance ecophenomenology include Simon P. James, Charles Brown, David Abrams and
Ted Toadvine. I focus my research on Ted Toadvine.
Charles S. Brown and Ted Toadvine, eds. Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself (Albany, NY:
State University Press, 2003), ix-x.
10
James, 5.
9

7
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1.3 Toadvine’s Proposal of Embodiment
Ted Toadvine proposes an alternative version of ecophenomenology. He is a particularly
compelling ecophenomenologist because he argues that any ethic must account for the lived
experience of difference. As bodies, we are restricted both physically and epistemologically.
What we can know is limited. All actions, therefore, should come out of an awareness of the
constant unknown, which can be described as everything that is epistemologically inaccessible in
a single moment. Toadvine questions the natural attitude of previous ethicists. The natural
attitude is made up of assumptions, beliefs, conceptions, and bodily dispositions that become
common sense through repetition. The convincing ‘naturalness’ of natural attitudes can stunt
self-reflection, epistemological growth, and understanding of human relations. It can prevent
critical thinking about both self and world. In environmental ethics, the natural attitude has
11

caused ethicists to ignore the experience of difference that surrounds us at all times.

His

concept of embodiment requires that we acknowledge the existence of difference that is always
present but can never be known. Toadvine asserts that the adoption of his embodied view, a
concept of difference that has been underappreciated if not ignored, is the key to understanding
the relatedness of a human to their environment. This is critical to any successful environmental
ethic.
1.4 Virtue of Attunement: A Revision of Embodiment
Although Toadvine’s embodied ethic is promising and I incorporate many of his ideas
including the Ontology of Sense and chiasma, there is a deficiency in his view of difference
11

Although all ecophenomenologists draw from lived experience, not all include a conception of
difference, which is why Toadvine is particularly compelling. An example of a prominent ecophenomenologist who
falls into a monistic worldview is David Abrams, The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a
More-Than-Human World (New York City: Random House Inc., 1996).

9

(what he calls Il y a). I argue that his totalizing view of difference ultimately disempowers the
body. Instead of using the body to know difference, Toadvine’s ethics only asks us to
acknowledge its existence. He stops before difference and admires its elusiveness. I think that
Toadvine fails to appreciate the possibility of demystifying and learning more about various
aspects of difference. Self-cultivation strategies contribute to, and engender the probability of the
openness to perceptual awareness of difference. This perspective should be included, discussed,
and examined in any approach to environmental ethics and the relation of human and
environment. While Toadvine may be right that we can never completely overcome difference, I
suggest and emphasize that through certain self-cultivations strategies, there are ways to become
increasingly aware of our natural attitudes and attune more attentively to the world around us. In
search of alternative views of embodiment that appreciate the ability to transform and learn about
both oneself and others, I turn to Yuasa Yasuo.
Yuasa is an embodiment ethicist who presents a historically influenced concept of the
body. Through repeated bodily practices, one can overcome some of the natural attitudes and
gain increased perceptual awareness of the surrounding world. Examples of embodied practices
have and do exist in many places throughout history, but I choose to focus on the specific
embodied approaches presented by Yuasa. Yuasa enters into dialogue well with Toadvine
because he uses the same phenomenological discourse while being firmly placed in the religious,
cultural, and academic framework of modern Japan. I draw on Yuasa’s interpretation of
embodiment and self-cultivation to supplement Toadvine’s picture of embodiment and
difference.

10

While Toadvine, Yuasa, and I all agree in the rootedness of the body in the world, Yuasa
has a different picture of embodiment that is useful in my alternative picture of difference.
Yuasa firmly places his concept of the body inside of a historical and cultural framework. His
ideas of repetition and historical body seem to be exactly what is lacking in Toadvine’s totalizing
and universal body. Knowing that bodies are culturally constructed, a virtue-centric revision of
embodiment has much promise. The virtue of learning about the Other through self-cultivations
and awareness of the self requires both practice and repetition of the body.
My thesis argues that Ted Toadvine’s ecophenomenology presents a concept of
difference that is totalizing and has a concept of the body that is a-historical and universal. By
using Yuasa Yasuo’s ideas that the body is culturally constructed and can be reconstituted
through repeated bodily practices, I revise Toadvine’s totalizing difference, emphasizing that we
can use our bodies to increasingly learn about difference. I call this a Virtue of Attunement.
Self-cultivation practices are an essential part of an embodied ecophenomenology. It not
only enables the existence of difference, but also gives us a practical option of responding with
our bodies to learn more about it. The responsibility to increasingly understand our environment
falls on an individual, empowering the body, agency, and capacity for compassion on a very
personal level.
In the following section, I give a detailed outline of Toadvine’s philosophy because much
of my work is based off of his model. I articulate his three main points which include the
Ontology of Sense, chiasma, and Il y a. After a presentation of Toadvine, I outline specific
problems with his conception of embodiment and difference. The third section proposes a
revised account of ecophenomenology using a Virtue of Attunement as an alternative to

11

Toadvine. I outline Yuasa’s Body-Scheme and concept of shugyo (self-cultivation) from which I
draw my revised account of embodiment. Using both Toadvine and Yuasa, I make conclusions
about a virtue-centric ecophenomenology and its promise for encountering difference. In the last
section, I address the broader conclusions that a Virtue of Attunement has on environmental
ethics.
12

Ted Toadvine: Ecophenomenology of Difference
In my summary of Toadvine’s proposal, it is important to recognize that his three basic
themes, the Ontology of Sense, chiasma, and Il y a, all play fundamentally important roles in his
picture of embodied perception, which is the center of his picture of ecophenomenology. I
explore them extensively because much of his thought is incorporated into my own work. The
Ontology of Sense presents the argument that sense is rooted in perception or, in other words,
that perception is inescapably rooted in the body. For Toadvine, this is the distinction between
an embodied and disembodied view. After understanding his theory of the embodied quality of
perception, I look at how Toadvine describes the lived perception of difference. By employing
the relational structure called the chiasma, Toadvine explains the perceptual awareness of
difference that breaks homogeneity presented by other ethicists. Finally, I look at Toadvine’s
understanding of difference. Il y a is Toadvine’s ontological claim that the world which we
experience is a world of difference.
Ted Toadvine is looking for an environmental ethic that does not succumb to
homogeneity, common in many contemporary approaches of describing the relationship between

12

Ted Toadvine is the head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Oregon, where he also
teaches in the Environmental Studies Department. He specializes in Continental Philosophy, philosophy of nature,
and environmental ethics. Toadvine has written and edited important works on Merleau-Ponty, and has been a
frontrunner of ecophenomenology. In 2010-2011, Toadvine taught as a Visiting Professor at Oberlin College.

12

humans and nature. He says, “…an ethics of nature cannot be developed on the basis of kinship,
continuity, or homogeneity… This is not to deny the necessity of traditional ethical inquiry or
practical activism, but simply to suggest that the attempt to ground such an ethics on a
metaphysically homogenous substratum be displaced by a phenomenology of the
impossible—that is, by an attentiveness to the resistance of what cannot be thought or perceived,
13

to the opacity of a wild being that circumscribes our concepts and percepts.” Toadvine is trying
to find a relationship between humans and nature that not only includes difference, but where
difference is the basis of the relationship.
An embodiment view is important to an environmental ethic that wants to address the
lived experience and relationship between an individual and nature. It posits a practical view that
demands that the body is essential in any relation between self and other. Toadvine’s version of
embodiment is particularly important to ecophenomenology because it addresses the problem of
difference that shapes our perception.
2.1 Ontology of Sense
Toadvine argues from an embodied perspective, which is one’s inescapable rootedness in
the body. The Ontology of Sense posits that if sense is rooted in perception and perception is
rooted in the body, sense is bound into our existence as embodied beings. Sense is the
physiological capacities of sensing organisms that give rise to perception. Although there is a
physiological sensing of the world, it is immediately filtered through screens of interpretation,
identification, and representation, otherwise known as perception. For Toadvine, sense is the

Ted Toadvine, “The Primacy of Desire and its Ecological Consequences,” in Ecophenomenology: Back
to the Earth Itself, eds. Charles S. Brown and Ted Toadvine (Albany, NY: State University Press, 2003), 139-154.
13

13

key that connects the human with the surrounding world, yet it cannot be isolated from
perception. There is an inescapable rootedness of perception in sense.
Perception can only occur by virtue of our sensing organs: eyes, ears, nose, mouth, skin.
This vision of embodiment, that perception is inescapably rooted in the body, is shared by many
ecophenomenologists. The body has the capacity to sense, perceive, and is the vessel through
which we transmit and receive data to and from the surrounding world. It is the foundation for
any environmental ethic.
Sense, Toadvine argues, is reacting to a physical world in which all bodies are engulfed.
The surrounding physical world is what he calls Nature. Through sense, humans and nature
connect. If one could isolate sense from perception momentarily, sense would exist and function
before any human-made distinction between nature and interpretation occur: “…sense is
ontologically basic…the telos of sense lies at a level deeper than the separation of nature and
14

subjectivity.”

One’s ability to sense is what fundamentally connects us to the world; it allows

us to participate with the world through the vehicle of our body.
However, sense cannot be removed from immediate perception. The human-nature
connection is not continuous, as other environmental ethicists present in more monistic
portrayals. Drawing from one’s lived experience, rather, the connection is incomplete, what
Toadvine calls ruptured. We cannot possibly know the depths of our surroundings, and even the
things that are sensed are not completely accessible to us because of our interpretative filters.
Even though sense responds directly to nature, our perception of sense prevents us from a full
expression of nature itself.

Ted Toadvine, “Singing the World in a New Key: Merleau-Ponty and the Ontology of Sense,” Janus
Head 7 no. 2 (2004): 279.
14

14

Toadvine, however, not only says that sense touches nature but that it is ontologically a
part of it. He draws from Merleau-Ponty stating that, “sense is transferred from nature to
language through the medium of the body.”

15

This suggests that sense is something that belongs

to nature, and can be translated into language through the body. In other words, without our
bodies we would not be able to sense at all and therefore unable to interact with nature. Sense
requires that our bodies are rooted in the world, and consequentially, any expression of this
sense, whether it take the form of language, action, behaviors, or art, is nature reflecting back on
itself and expressing itself on its own terms. Expression is any response of the body to its
embedded position in the world. Toadvine says, “The reawakening of the experience of the body
as a ‘natural self,’ then, is in the service of reawakening our experience of the sensible world,
16

which is fundamentally—ontologically—a movement of expression.” We are already in the
process of perception and thought, so expression is a constantly happening state. It is inevitably
occurring. According to Toadvine, expression occurs because of the encounter of others
different from the self. Before elaborating more on the characteristics of expression, I will delve
into the relationship towards the other that is central in Toadvine’s ecophenomenology.
That our perception is fundamentally rooted in the body is important to any
environmental ethic. It takes into consideration the importance of lived experience. Any ethic
that disregards this notion is in danger of a disembodied account that depreciates the individual
role in relating to self and other. The Ontology of Sense firmly grounds Toadvine into the school
of embodiment. Toadvine goes beyond other ecophenomenologists, however, because he
focuses on the lived experience of encountering difference. Through a deconstruction of that
15
16

2009), 50.

Toadvine, “Singing,” 276.
Ted Toadvine, Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Nature (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
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experience, Toadvine presents an explanation for the perceptual awareness of difference that
breaks through the homogeneity that other environmental ethicists including other
17

ecophenomenologists have failed to address. Toadvine calls this the chiasma, drawing and
expanding upon Merleau-Ponty. The chiasma is the description of how difference is perceived.
2.1.1 Chiasma. Toadvine argues that the chiasmic relationship between humans and
nature allow for difference. Instead of a harmonious body of nature of which we are an
extension, it is a cacophony of atonal sound: “...even if all expressions could give voice at once,
the result would not be cosmic harmony but cacophony, since the perspectives they represent are
incompossible [sic]…”

18

The chiasmic structure is a term that describes two bodies that become

sensible to one another in the lived world. There is a point of connection when sensation
intersects, then relays information to each subject. Although there is a meeting point that allows
for much potential empathy, the first person can never entirely know how the other is
experiencing the encounter from their perspective. Merleau-Ponty, from whom Toadvine draws
upon, describes such a meeting: “I see your image, but you don’t see how I see you and vice
versa. And no matter how far we advance in our mutual understanding, as much as we reflect, so
19

much will we be different.” Although there is an interaction in space (which at times are
mutually-explicit exchanges), the interaction will always be at least two-sided; the gap of
difference is never crossed. Chiasma, therefore, allows two separate, embodied entities to
interact in space without collapsing into one another, as a homogeneous framework has a

17

An example can be found in Toadvine’s critique of David Abrams homogeneous ecophenomenology.
Abrams played an important role in popularizing ecophenomenology to readers outside of environmental ethics. To
read Toadvine’s critique, look at “Limits of the Flesh: The Role of Reflection in David Abram’s
Ecophenomenology,” Environmental Ethics 27 no. 2 (2005): 155-170.
18
Toadvine, “Singing,” 280.
19
Toadvine, Merleau-Ponty, 110.
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tendency to do. It also implies that the difference between the two embodied entities can never
fully be overcome.
While difference cannot be overcome, encountering the other’s characteristics does give
insight about the characteristics of the self. For example, I gain awareness of my body relative to
the other. Let’s say that I accidently bump into a tree. I am suddenly aware of the sensation of
my arm that has hit the tree, my arm which was out of mind and, in that moment, inaccessible to
me. But by hitting the other I become aware of my arm. The rough solidity of the bark also
brings awareness of the opposing qualities in my arm. My arm is soft and malleable in
comparison. Toadvine uses this chiasmic encounter to address the human-nature relationship:
“To reconsider the being of nature is also to reconsider our own being, and the moment when the
being of nature and of the human cross. It is this moment of crossing, the becoming-nature of
humanity and the becoming-human of nature to which Merleau-Ponty applies the term chiasma.”
20

It is by encountering the other that one compares their relatedness and thus learns about the

self.
The other implication is that while an encounter with the Other brings about new
realizations, another world of knowledge closes. As my attention turns to the qualities of my
arm hitting against the tree, I loose perception of other elements. My arm that has hit the tree,
above, has caused me to forget about the persisting ache of my foot. Awareness of other parts of
my body, other thoughts, ideas, desires, etc. that I might have had moments before suddenly
disappear into a distant horizon.

20

Toadvine, Merleau-Ponty, 109.
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Toadvine’s notion of difference separates him from other ecophenomenologists.
Difference of others is always present, preventing a monistic worldview suggested by other
environmental ethicists. Additionally, there are complexities in our own bodies that disallow the
ability to experience continuity even in ourselves. This totalizing and invasive vision of
difference is distinct from other embodied ecophenomenologists. The consequence of the
chiasma, for Toadvine, is that we are embedded in a world of unconquerable difference of the
unknown. The ontological claim that the world we experience is one of difference is what
Toadvine names Il y a.

18

2.2 Il y a
What separates Toadvine from other ecophenomenologists is his concept of difference.
Toadvine is concerned with the lived experience that nature resists to be known. The resistance
of nature is Toadvine’s response to other environmental ethicists, including phenomenologists,
who often present a monistic framework. An example Toadvine’s difference is laid out in his
21

essay called “The Primacy of Desire.”

The methodology in “The Primacy of Desire” is to deconstruct phenomenology itself in
order to understand how we value nature. In doing so, he goes as far as to deconstruct embodied
perception itself. He begins with familiar criticisms towards environmental ethicists who have a
tendency to sympathize with a monistic relationship between humans and the environment.
However, the lived human experience of nature does not show only harmony, but discontinuity,
struggle, and resistance. In his philosophy, he wants to include that, first, all value is a human
construction; and second, that the natural world has value in itself. If humans and nature are
ontologically connected by sense, the human process of value could perhaps be an extension of
the evaluative processes of nature.
Through a process of anti-reduction to either side, he deconstructs phenomenology in
order to understand how to value nature. Toadvine appropriates Merleau-Ponty’s concept that all
interaction between self and world occurs at the body through sensual perception, and that this
interaction is a bodily dialogue between the perceiver and the perceived through the chiasmic
structure. He gives agency to both parties involved, saying that there is a reciprocal dialogue of
information. But even before the interchange of data can occur through the chiasmic encounter,

21

Toadvine, “Primacy,” 139-154.
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the perceiver’s senses must first be summoned; there is an ‘invisible calling’ of the perceived
thing itself. The calling or solicitation for attention by the perceived thing is what opens the
world to perception. Yet, as soon as the perceiving begins, the calling cannot be seen. Although
he has found it through a phenomenological method, the thing itself escapes a phenomenological
inquiry. This is the true exterior, the world outside of perception.
He focuses on Merleau-Ponty for his work on the visible/invisible and the concept of Il y
a, which is the “existence without being;” the something you find in nothing. He says that
phenomenology has led us to the idea of the calling, but it is impossible to experience it because
it lies outside of experience. This thing beyond perception is the answer to the resistance that
interrupts an otherwise monistic world: “I suggest that Il y a is the soil of the desire and
22

resistance animating what is otherwise a monistic ontology.”

It seems that at the horizon of our bodies there is the constant threat of difference. There
is infinite difference in others – it is reasonable to say that I can never know what it is like to be
another from their perspective. But for Toadvine, the difference is much closer, it is at the
constant horizon of our bodies. For example, as I concentrate on the ache in my foot, I lose
access to the awareness of most other parts of the body. How does my arm feel swinging in
space? What characteristics does my stomach have? How is my posture today? The list of things
is infinite but as I concentrate on the ache in my foot, the other concerns disappear into the
horizon of unknown. Even if I have all my attention on my aching foot, as soon as my arm
bumps into a tree, all that attention potentially disappears as the world of perception occurs in

22

Toadvine, “Primacy,” 149.
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regards to my arm interacting with the world. The world of difference is constantly on the
horizon, pushing into the peripheries of our bodies at all times.
Il y a is the ontological claim that the world in which our bodies are embedded is one of
difference. Toadvine does not fear or dread Il y a, but celebrates it. Without difference, one
would not be able to have individual expressions. As stated earlier, expression is the body’s
response to its embedded-ness in the world that can manifest as language, action, behavior, or
art, for example. Il y a provides a space for expression to occur. Expressive movements depend
on the assumption that other identities can never be truly known. They are born out of the gap of
difference, “it is through expression that a relation of distance can paradoxically be a proximity.
If expression is the bond between nature and culture, this is because it is neither a relation of
resemblance nor of representation…it is precisely the ‘failure’ of identity that opens sense as a
23

movement of expression.” Expression is the result of the human-nature interaction: “Everything
comes to pass as if expression arose through the world’s striving to be perceived, to be painted,
spoken, and thought. My body’s struggle to express would then be nothing other than the
world’s struggle to express itself through me, as if I were an organ of this single massive body
24

named Nature.” It seems that humans are nature’s engines of self-expression, the ability to look
back on itself. He further says that besides the gap of difference, there is otherwise no other
25

“ontological break between expression and expressed,” and difference is necessary for
movement, action, thought, and response to the world. Expression involves an attitude towards
nature on nature’s own terms, using the subject as the body for expression. Toadvine describes
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the extension of nature through humans and vice versa: “the world thinks itself in me, if I am its
26

consciousness.”

Il y a is Toadvine’s picture of totalizing difference. By attuning into Il y a, Toadvine
believes that there can be an environmental ethic that is neither reduced to monistic frameworks
nor frameworks that ignore the human lived experience of difference.
2.3 Problems of an Impossible Ecophenomenology
Toadvine’s philosophy is still coming to fruition and more work will surely further
complete his ideas. However, based on his material thus far, I will point out a few problems with
Toadvine’s view of embodiment and difference. I argue that while Toadvine presents a
promising embodied environmental ethics of difference, he fails to appreciate the capacity of the
body to cultivate increased awareness of difference.
Toadvine is convincing in many aspects and raises important concerns of how an
embodied environmental ethic might acknowledge the world of difference in which we are
embedded. His celebration of difference, however, is so totalizing that it mystifies difference
into a pseudo-religious realm that cannot be overcome. This impossible environmental ethic
actually works against itself because it does not give any options for the body. Toadvine’s
difference is total and transcendent. It escapes rational analysis of the mind and perceptual
analysis of the body. We are left at an impasse, where the body itself has been deconstructed and
is no longer useful in attempts to understand the resistance of nature. While I agree that
Merleau-Ponty’s anti-reductionist approach wants to include difference, it is unlikely that the
difference is so totalizing that it disembodies the philosophy itself. Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty
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discusses how phenomenology can transform the body, suggesting that the body has an active
role in epistemological awareness. In Toadvine’s ecophenomenology, there is no opportunity to
embark on a process of increasing knowledge on difference. While difference can never be
completely understood or overcome, the capacity to become increasingly aware of difference
does not seem unreasonable. The body can perhaps be habituated to be more or less sensitive to
the difference that surrounds it. The capacity of the body, in my opinion, is underappreciated in
Toadvine’s impossible phenomenology. An embodied approach to environmental ethics is
critical if we are to include the human lived experience of nature and be reflective of human
constructed values of nature and our surrounding world. Further, it is necessary for personal
normative responses to the environment.
The second problem of Toadvine is his concept of the body that is universalizing and
a-historical. He does not acknowledge that bodies are shaped by history, culture, and personal
practices. Instead, his timeless concept of the body lies in a complete world of difference and
has little agency. He does not explain how bodies, with various understandings of difference,
might approach Il y a. Il y a itself is a concept that arises within a certain time and place, a result
of changing epistemological history and ideas. An embodied ethic needs to account for
transformative concepts of the body as human-constructed notions of the body and the world
change.
Finally, Toadvine’s ethics do not call for normative responses of the body. His ethics
merely ask that we acknowledge that this is a world of difference, but does not call for any action
beyond that. I suggest that not only are we bodies but, more importantly, we can use the body to
learn new and more complex expressions. Because our bodies are culturally and historically
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constructed, a virtue ethic could potentially help to shape our body in a way that encounters
difference with increasing sensitivity. Value could be put on methods of bodily action and
cultivation. I propose that through self-cultivation practices, the body can attune to and learn
about difference. I call such an ethic a Virtue of Attunement.
My amendments to Toadvine’s self-cultivation strategies are supplemented by Yuasa
Yasuo’s self-cultivation strategies. By engaging with Yuasa’s conception of the body, I attempt
to revise Toadvine’s view of totalizing difference, bringing agency and appreciation to the
practical capacity of the body in a modified version of environmental ethics.
Virtue of Attunement: Contributions of Embodied Practices to Ecophenomenology
Environmental ethics needs to take into account that we are undeniably rooted in the
world. This embodied approach is the foundation of ecophenomenology. As embodied beings,
we find ourselves embedded in a world of difference, a perspective ignored by popular trends in
environmental ethics that seek a homogeneous framework. Toadvine’s concept of Il y a claims
that the world we live in is, in fact, a world of difference. In an attempt to extend on Toadvine’s
work, I propose that not only do we live in a world of difference, but we can use our bodies to
attune to difference, opening up to greater epistemological perspectives. There are practices of
the body that can be cultivated in order to become more aware of self and world. I turn away
from Toadvine’s totalizing difference and, instead, emphasize lived practices of the body where
embodied habits can increasingly learn about difference, inspired by Yuasa’s embodiment
theory. I will first reiterate problems with Toadvine and my proposed solution, engaging Yuasa
into the conversation. Second, I will elaborate on Yuasa’s key points which include
Body-Scheme, a concept first coined by Merleau-Ponty but further elaborated on by Yuasa; and
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shugyo, Yuasa’s interpretation of self-cultivation practices. Finally, I will conclude with the
concept of a Virtue of Attunement and its implications on environmental ethics as a whole.
3.1 An Alternative to Ted Toadvine: Self-Cultivation Practices
The most pertinent problem is changing Toadvine’s view of totalizing difference. I
propose that not only do we live in a world of difference, we can use our bodies to attune to
difference. A body that can change its deposition to be more sensitive to difference, as I argue,
must be a body that is historically and culturally constructed. It has to be capable of change. The
second adaptation to Toadvine is re-conceptualizing the body from a universal and
de-historicized one to another that is explicitly shaped by context. By establishing that the body
is culturally constructed, I propose that an embodied virtue ethic can habituate the body in
context to become sensitive to its encounter with difference. This is a self-cultivation practice
contribution to ecophenomenology.
My proposal draws largely from Yuasa Yasuo. His theory of embodiment is one that is
explicitly shaped by a particular culture. He states that Japanese religions, history, and
27

philosophy influences his picture of the body. Furthermore, he provides specific examples of
self-cultivation strategies as a method of attunement that opens the subject up to new
epistemological perspectives. In Yuasa’s case, he draws from bodily practices that he has
encountered from his cultural context. Through habituation, the body can transform itself,
opening up for opportunities to perceive the world in new ways not previously or consistently
available. He explicitly values greater epistemological perspectives and therefore values the
method and process of attuning the body to make epistemological growth possible. The
27

For my purposes, I wish to underline Yuasa’s indebtedness to phenomenology, especially of Heidegger
and Merleau-Ponty. However, by no means are these his only Western influences, he openly draws from other
Eastern and Western thinkers as well.
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emphasis on embodied interactions with difference takes greater centrality over ontological
claims of difference transcendent from the lived experience.
The revisions may assist to construct a more comprehensive environmental ethic. I use
Toadvine’s chiasmic structure so that beings in the world can connect through interaction
without a monistic collapse. However, Yuasa’s description of the body and bodily practices can
provide specific examples of how to habitually dispose one’s bodies to more fulfilling chiasmic
relationships. It is more fulfilling because the transforming body can be more aware of greater
nuances in occurring chiasmic relationships that lead to greater sensitivity to difference.
Additionally, by being more attuned to the world, it is possible to engage in dialogue or
interactions (through chiasmic relationships) with subjects or bodies that were often ignored,
overlooked, or unavailable before. It uncovers some of the blind-spots in personal assumptions
and knowledge, allowing space to listen to difference. Bodily cultivations can create at ethic of
observation and attunement that change how one can live in relation to and interact with the
world though the extent of the openness may depend on the practice. Yuasa can contribute to
Toadvine’s uncertainties by providing a method of embodied transformations that lead to a lived
embodied environmental ethic.
These practices are part of cultural and religious history that transforms a particular
culturally-defined body, leading to the second contribution of Yuasa to Toadvine. By being
explicit about his religious and cultural frameworks, history, and influences, Yuasa moves away
from Toadvine’s a-historical and essentializing concept of a body to a specific example of how
bodies exist in the world. I will summarize Yuasa’s concepts of Body-Scheme and shugyo
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which will be used in my revised embodied environmental ethics which I call a Virtue of
Attunement.
28

3.2 Yuasa

29

In his work, The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory, Yuasa examines several
contemporary Japanese philosophers, historical religious figures, and Western thinkers that help
to influence and shape his conception of the body. These include the scholars Watsuji and
Nishida, Buddhist figures Dogen and Kukai, and Continental thinker Merleau-Ponty.
30

3.2.1 Body-Scheme. The concept of a Body-Scheme is first found in Merleau-Ponty.

It

is a way to categorize different functions of the body without necessarily isolating separate parts
but rather highlighting them for linguistic clarity, acknowledging the constant interactions and
influences of one organ or function over another. Yuasa takes Merleau-Ponty’s structure and
splits the body into four circuits for examination. The first circuit is the Sensory-Motor Circuit.
It involves sensory organs (skin, eyes, nose, ears, and tongue) that directly receives and responds
31
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to external stimuli. The second circuit deals with muscle memory.

Habituated bodily actions

are stored or remembered in muscles. Once embodied memory is attained, it does not always
need conscious attention or exertion of the intentional mind, but are habituated to work
28

Yuasa Yasuo (1925-2005) was a contemporary Japanese scholar whose prolific and varied work was
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influenced by his advisor Watsuji Tetsuro whose work concentrated on the ethics of the community. The importance
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Yuasa continues the academic tradition of both Watsuji’s and Nishida Kitaro’s comparative philosophical work
from Japanese and European traditions.
29
Yuasa Yasuo, The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory, ed. T.P. Kasulis, trans. Nagatomo
Shigenori and T.P. Kasulis (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987).
30
For more reading, examine Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Body as Object and Mechanistic Physiology,”
in Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1962), 73-90.
31
Nagatomo, “Yuasa’s Body-Scheme,” in Attunement of the Body (Albany, NY: State University of New
York, 1992), 60. This essay was originally a lecture by Professor Nagatomo summarizing Yuasa’s body-scheme. It
is now printed as a chapter in Nagatomo’s book Attunement of the Body.
32
Nagatomo, 60-63.

27

intuitively. Such examples could be playing a familiar song on the piano that does not require
active mental effort because the finger muscles have already memorized the song. Yuasa is
33

drawing from Merleau-Ponty’s idea of habit-body or embodied knowledge. The third circuit in
Yuasa’s Body-Scheme is the Emotion-Instinct circuit.
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He discusses how emotional states such

as stress or anger can affect certain organs. For example, stress often increases breath rate in the
lungs, which consequently increases heart rate (and vice versa), which can further stimulate or
restrict digestive organs. It is known that stress can cause digestive problems because it puts the
body into fight or flight mode. The result is that digestion becomes secondary to what the body
believes to be an immediate danger. The modern human body is often put under abnormal states
of prolonged stress. The Emotion-Instinct Circuit is usually subconscious in one’s everyday
lived experience. An individual is not usually aware of the extent that emotional states influence
and impact the body. It is here that Yuasa begins his work on self-cultivation or shugyo. By
becoming aware of the interactions of the body, the barriers between each circuit becomes more
transparent. Habituated actions, such as breathing practices, attune one to the changes of lung
function and thus increasingly nuanced emotional states of the self.

While the first circuit

(sensory organs) is easy to recognize and use with intention, the higher the circuit number, the
more inaccessible it becomes. Hearing is more obvious and conscious than muscle memory,
which in turn is more transparent than emotional influences on the body. Nagatomo describes
Yuasa’s different circuits by their accessibility to be understood: “the difference in control
correlates with an awareness of the body which decreases in transparency.”
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greater one understands a circuit, the greater ability one has to manipulate it.
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 142-147.
Nagatomo, 63-64.
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In other words, the
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While the third circuit, the Emotional-Instinct Circuit, is the most ambiguous of the three
mentioned, it is not always obscured beyond recognition. Depending on each person’s
sensitivity, awareness of how emotions are influencing the body (or vice versa) can be
occasional or even frequent. However, there is a fourth circuit that is absolutely invisible until
one begins self-cultivations practices such as those found in Japanese religious frameworks. The
fourth circuit, which Yuasa calls the Unconscious Quasi-Body, is not accessed through the
everyday lived experience.
Although I will, for now, not go into detail about Yuasa’s concept of Ki-meridians
(energy centers often addressed in traditional Japanese and Chinese medicine), it is interesting
that both Toadvine and Yuasa appropriate Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between the visible and
36

the invisible.

While Toadvine calls the invisible the characteristic of nature that will always be

invisible from perception and causes metaphysical difference, Yuasa sees the invisible only as a
temporary. Through self-cultivation practice, one can overcome the natural attitude and make
visible the previously inaccessible circuit of Unconscious Quasi-Body.
3.2.2 Shugyo: Self-Cultivation. Self-cultivation enhances the awareness (mind) of each
circuit (body) and the fluidity between them. Nagatomo describes the purpose of shugyo is to
“enhance the degree of correlativity between the movements of mind and those of body…
ultimately it produces the spiritual goal of developing an all-round personality.”
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One’s

emotional and mental states affect how one understands their position in the world and the things
happening around them. They shape how we generate meaning. By understanding how
The Visible and the Invisible was Merleau-Ponty’s final project at the time of his death. The
uncompleted work is a contentious piece and has been interpreted by scholars in a variety of ways. Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, ed. Claude Leforte, trans. Alphonso Lingus (Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1968).
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emotional tides change the generation of meaning, it gives one more agency to deflate emotional
influence among other personal assumptions and, instead, be more sensitive to the outside world.
Although filtration of perception by the subject is inevitable, self-cultivation is a means of
providing the subject more agency to choose one’s filters. It also assumes that there is an
38

objective world outside of the body, known as the inter-subjective world, where multiple
subjects interact and respond through the chiasmic relationship. Self-cultivation practices
presented by Yuasa cause a subject to move towards an attunement and sensitivity to the
inter-subjective space through greater understanding and unification of the body.
Increased control of emotions must be done through habituation of body, not exercises of
mind.
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The body influences habits of the mind, including the way we value things in the

external world, or nature. Although the word ‘control’ has strong connotations, what I think
Yuasa means is that control is not a suppression of emotions but rather an awareness of different
stimuli, influences, and reactions of and on the body. Additionally, control can allow one to
choose which emotional states they would prefer to strengthen. Nagatomo states, “If the
negative emotion is always stressed, a pathological state will result, but on the other hand, if the
40

positive emotion is always strengthened, it will nurture more mature psychological traits.”

While emotions are much more complex than simply negative or positive, Nagatomo makes a
clear statement of how enhancing certain emotions transforms the body physically (through the
strengthening of neural pathways) into one that is more likely to behave in the world in what
Yuasa deems a moral way. Why embark in a body and personality transformation? For Yuasa,
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it provides for a greater epistemological perspective. I argue that it also allows one to embody an
ethic that discovers how one interacts with the world by understanding the habits of the body.
An example of Yuasa’s self-cultivation practice is found in the example of meditation.
With practice, regulated and habituated breathing styles become familiar to the body. Overtime,
the body becomes habituated to regular breathing habits that become the normal response.
Breathing becomes a resource during times of emotional stress. For advanced practitioners, the
body automatically brings the breath back to normal levels, and the feelings of stress, fear, or
anger become more manageable and do not necessarily alter or distort how we see the world
outside. This instinctual behavior, which has become muscle memory, takes control of the
action. Yuasa categorizes this as dark conscious. Dark conscious is not unconscious, but rather
the part of our consciousness that is not clear or completely at hand during normal reflection and
processing. It is here that emotions and instincts are habituated.
Yuasa outlines several historical versions of meditation, including those of Dogen and
Kukai, proving that there are multiple ways to go about self-cultivation practices. Other
examples of shugyo that Yuasa includes are poetry, art, and martial arts. His interest in
meditation is that it “brings to the surface the complexities and emotions sunk in the unconscious
region, freeing them and ultimately dissolving them by slowing the conscious activities
41

connected with the cerebral functions.”

What he seems to be doing is empowering the dark

consciousness, which is perhaps the complexity of human nature that Toadvine finds resistant.
The unreachable natural side of the human mind is what Yuasa calls dark consciousness. Yuasa
acknowledges the resistance found in Toadvine while also wishing to transform it. His idea of
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body transformation directly addresses the difference because cultivation is a training of dark
consciousness to take over main functions so that we act (or express) spiritually, creatively, and
spontaneously. Habituated practices shape dark conscious and the body so that it allows the
resistance of nature to express itself on its own terms. It cultivates Toadvine’s difference into
controlled and meaningful expression. For Yuasa, the habituated body is the key to influencing
how one lives in his or her landscape.
3.3 Applying Yuasa to Toadvine
Yuasa presents a conception of the body that appreciates historical formation. He
acknowledges that bodies are historically constructed but can be partially reshaped by
self-cultivation practices. Yuasa’s embodiment ethic can contribute to the conversation by
moving away from the fascination with difference, back to the possibilities of the body that
encounters difference.
Through repetitive self-cultivation practices, the body creates habits that can
physiologically change the relationship between perception and processing, altering how we
understand and value the external world and ourselves. Yuasa proposes that through an
attunement of body, one can interact with the world in a various manners that can move away
from the natural attitude. He notes that intentional changes in habituated mental processing,
what I call the natural attitude, need to be addressed on the level of the body. In everyday
experience, these emotional states are often largely unexamined yet influence our evaluation of
the meanings of the external world. The result is an automatic response to the external world
that can exclude learning new perspectives on difference. For example, a lost and stressed person
without a self-practice, let’s say, tries to get on a bus to return to their hotel. Right as they are
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about to step on, someone pushes them out of the way and jumps into the bus first. The typical
reaction would likely be anger because of their stressed emotional deposition; they may fail to
see that the other ran into the bus to tend to someone in distress. While this may be an extreme
example, it does seem that emotions color how we generate meaning. In this case, their
emotional state prevented them from seeing other happenings in their surrounding world.
Through regulated breathing practices, however, Yuasa claims that emotions are not necessarily
controlled, but noticed and acknowledged, preventing such an unconscious influence of emotion
on perception, processing, and behavior. Breathing practices help to map one’s natural attitudes,
giving one more agency in the generation of the meaning. Toadvine claims that paying attention
to the resistant invisible quality of nature is the only way to “enjoy the full reality of the thing,”
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though it is impossible to pay attention to it through body or thought. Yuasa, on the other hand,
shows that creating certain habits in the body can foster an understanding of reality that is not as
influenced by emotional subjectivity.
Yuasa puts explicit value on bodily responses, whereas Toadvine does not distinguish
value between the modes of expression. He states that the variety of response to the invisible
43

quality of nature create a “cacophony” of simultaneous and incompatible voices.

However, it

seems important that in a lived philosophy, evaluative distinctions are made regarding human
behavior. My lived experience shows that some actions, thoughts, language, etc. are more
hurtful and helpful than others. Yet, this is not accounted for in Toadvine’s description of
expression. Yuasa would posit that a bodily practice leads to the more valuable form of
expression.
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If we use Yuasa’s embodied ethic, there is a distinct change to my encounter with the
tree, to reuse my example from earlier. For Toadvine, every time I have an encounter with
another, my attention changes from my headache and other concerns to the sensation of my arm.
When one world of knowledge opens, another one closes, keeping me contained in a world of
difference. Using Yuasa’s conception of the body, however, I argue that I can understand
difference with an entirely changed approach. For the person who has not undergone
self-cultivation practices, natural attitudes will general kick in when hitting the tree. For many,
that may mean frustration with the tree, or turning all attention to the arm. Toadvine sees this as
unconquerable difference. However, if one undergoes a practice like breathing habituation,
bumping into the tree will result differently. Because fluster and frustration are very much a
physiological response as they are emotional, there is increased heart rate and quickened
breathing, a habituated breathing pattern of calm regulated breathing can prevent such an
immediately distracting response. These practices bring awareness to my arm bumping into the
tree without necessarily closing off other worlds. Because I prevented the frustration, I don’t
necessarily have to forget about my headache. By practicing awareness of my own body, I
engender the possibility to see other things occurring around me. While I hit the tree, I can also
notice birds flying out of the tree, or someone running over to help me. Often, the natural
attitude can create all sorts of blind-spots in an individual’s perception. However, awareness of
how these natural attitudes formulate and creating new habits that allow an attunement to the
surrounding world posits another approach to encountering difference. One world does not have
to close when another one opens. Rather, for every seeing of something there is a potential to see
something else. Yuasa’s self-cultivation practices increase the potential to see something else,
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and therefore gain new perspectives of the world of difference that surrounds us. The capacity of
the body to be aware of and learn about difference is as much, if not more so, a part of virtue as it
is discovering the world of difference for the first time, as suggested by Toadvine. A Virtue of
Attunement therefore attempts to overcome the natural attitude of Toadvine by appreciating the
capacity of the body to gain increased epistemological perspectives on difference.
3.4 Conclusions
While Toadvine, Yuasa, and I all work out of embodiment theory, acknowledging that we
are fundamentally embedded in the world, I disagree with Toadvine’s conception of difference.
Instead of concluding that an environmental ethic should acknowledge that we live in a world of
difference, I think that environmental ethics can use the body to learn more about difference,
even though it can never be completely overcome. The emphasis lies on learning and discovery.
Any environmental ethic should include that bodies are culturally and historically constructed.
That a body can change gives potential agency to reinterpret itself. Yuasa says that the body can
be restructured through self-cultivation strategies. Yuasa contributes to Toadvine who has an
a-historical view of the body and does know acknowledge that definitions of both body and
difference can change over time.
Because the body is historically formed, a virtue ethic is a promising approach to
encountering difference. By valuing the capacity of the body to change and learn, new habits are
formed that appreciate difference in new ways. It allows a space for other voices to come into
the forefront, aspiring for those that are normally unheard or silenced. While there will always
be blind-spots, the aspiration to include difference is possible using Yuasa’s method of
self-cultivation practices. Toadvine’s work posits that any environmental ethic must include
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difference, but my revision of difference continues on by saying the body has a role and
responsibility to encounter difference.
Environmental concern has grown exponentially in recent years, proven clearly by
political and social shifts to be more ‘green.’ However, embodied environmental ethics,
especially of ecophenomenology, allows for personal embodied agency. This can supplement
the macro-level approaches to provide for a more rounded cultural approach to environmental
ethics.
Broader Conclusions on Environmental Ethics
Self-cultivation practices have can play an important role in ecophenomenology. They
appreciate the capacity to use the body in shaping lived experience, especially in encountering
difference. This falls under the larger category of an embodied environmental ethic. Because
environmental ethics deals with the world in which we are embedded, it must take into account
our bodies. Our bodies are what moves through the world and any environmental ethic that
ignores the body is missing a critical component of how we experience our surroundings. It can
have unintended negative consequences such as ignoring human needs on both an individual and
community level. An embodied view is also essential in empowering the individual body in
ethics. It supplements both personal and institutional approaches to the responsibility to the
environment. Institutional policies become more balanced when they take into consideration the
importance of personal experiences of the environment. They can help to address the problems
communities face on the grounds.
Finally, a Virtue of Attunement is important for encountering difference with respect,
openness, and space so that the Other can speak on its own terms. Self and Other coexist within
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the world separately, but it is through observing, sensing, or attuning to the other by mapping
one’s natural attitudes that one can become united through difference. Merleau-Ponty has theory
that an attunement of one’s body is also an attunement to nature. He says, “Whenever I try to
understand myself, the whole fabric of the perceptible world comes too, and with it comes the
44

others who are caught in it.” Any environmental ethic that wants to appreciate others and
difference needs to understand precisely how the body is embedded in the world. As the world
becomes ever more global, it is important to embrace an ethic that leaves a space for difference,
instead of trying to overpower or ignore it. A Virtue of Attunement leaves space for difference
and aspires for compassion and empathy. It does not make difference exotic, nor does it collapse
into difference to become a monistic worldview. Rather, it opens up the possibility to encounter
new types of difference. By opening up the definition of environmental ethics, we can see how
important these questions of relatedness have become in the modern world.
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